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TIlE KlGHTS AND WRONGS OF INTERGENERATIONAL EXTERNALITIES 
CUve L Spash 
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IN1RODUCI10N 
The current population of the earth is responsible for a large and growing class of 
actions resulting in persistent environmental damages. There is concern for the 
effects of the free disposal of wastes because many of the substances created are 
highly toxic, their absolute quantity is far in excess of the natural assimilative capacity 
of the environment, they can bioaccumulate, and once created they may persist for 
many decades, centuries, or longer. Examples of such actions include: the creation 
and release into the environment of persistent toxic chemicals (such as PCBs); the 
production of radioactive materials during the operation and decommissioning of 
nuclear power stations; the release of chloroflurocarbons, causing the destruction of 
the stratospheric ozone layer; and the combustion of fossil fuels, which may cause 
global climate change via the greenhouse effect. The resulting environmental 
damages are significant, irreversible, long term, and asymmetrically distributed over 
time, ie, the net benefits accrue now, and the net costs accrue in the future. 
As the general pervasiveness of persistent damages increases, an answer is needed to 
the question: should this generation care about those of its actions which result in a 
degraded environment in the further future? And, if we do care, what should be 
done in response? Both environmental economics and environmental philosophy 
have attempted to answer these questions, however, cross-fertilisation of ideas has 
been limited. By drawing on, and comparing, both these fields of knowledge, current 
obligations in the face of future environmental damages are analysed. 
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In this paper the argument is made that in choosing the discount rate, economists 
take an ethical view about the claims of future generations. The ethical position has 
received little attention or justification. Four justifications for discounting future 
claims are considered and rejected. The alternative approach adopted by 
environmental economists is to come to ethical terms with the future by studying the 
policy implications of various ethical principles. However, the principles employed 
are found to possess too many attributes of utilitarianism to do justice to the belief 
that future people may be harmed by our present policies and have a right to be free 
from such harm. The acceptance of such a right entities future people to either 
compensation in the form of transfers or a veto over certain policies.! 
DISCOUNTING TIlE FUTURE 
Dllcountlna1a performed to cltlculate the present value of a stream of costs and 
benefits u5sociltted with It project or policy. The present value represents the amount 
of money that must be borrowed at a given interest rate to supply the same stream of 
net returns as would be obtained through the project or policy, given perfect capital 
markets. If benefits exceed costs in every time period the present value is positive for 
any discount rate. Generally, however, the choice of the social discount rate is crucial 
in determining whether the present value is positive or negative. 
The process of discounting the future is defended by economists as the way people 
behave and value things. Both consumers, via a positive rate of time preference,l and 
producers, via the sncial opportunity cost of capital, are observed to treat the future 
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as less important than the present. Consumers lend money and expect to be 
rewarded for their abstinence from consumption, eg. savings account interest. 
Producers earn more interest on earlier cash receipts by loaning them to others in the 
economy and tying into their productivity; making earlier profits more valuable. 
Neoclassical economists have shown how, in a simplified world, a unique discount 
rate is determined by the market. Individual rates of time preference determine 
decisions over present consumption and savings (the marginal rates of substitution 
between present and deferred consumption). Aggregate savings provide a supply of 
loanable funds. Deferring current consumption increases future income via the 
marginal productivity of capital. Under perfect competition, savings and investment 
schedules intersect to define a unique equilibrium, where the marginal rate of return 
on capital equals the marginal rate of time preference.' That is, a single discount 
rate prevails. 
The suitability of the market-determined discount rate for long term, public policy 
decisions is brought into question by the fact that only the time preferences of the 
present generation enter into the process. Individuals with finite life expectancies are 
likely to act differently in their private co~umption decisions from a society that has 
a collective commitment to life in perpetuity.4 Thus, the supply of loanable funds for 
investment is influenced by private time preferences that diverge from a collectively 
determined rate of social time preference. A higher discount rate than is socially 
optimal will occur and the level of investment will be too low to make adequate 
provision for future generations.' 
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In fact, the process of discounting the future, at almost any positive rate, creates 
insignificant present values for even catastrophic losses in the further future. Thus, 
the standard application of cost-benefit analysis to long term environmental damages 
gives the impression that the distant future is almost valueless. In addition, the 
distribution of net costs in the future, and net benefits now, makes the actions 
responsible for long term environmental damages falsely attractive. 
Some authors believe discounting future streams of costs and benefits (on the grounds 
of time preference or capital productivity) has been widely accepted by economists.6 
The only problem then lies in practising the technique. In arguing about the choice 
of a social rate of discount the economics literature can be split into the following 
eateaories: 
(i) an Infinite lOeial discount rate should be used; 
(11) the intergenerational (between generations) discount rate should be greater than 
zero but less than infinity; 
(iii) (a) the intratemporal (within a generation) and intergenerational discount rates 
should be the same; or, 
(iii) (b) the appropriate social discount rate is zero; and 
(iv) a negative intertemporal discount rate should be used. 
Lemons has placed the philosophical viewpoints on whether a duty to posterity exists 
into three categories:7 
(i) no moral obligations beyond the immediate future exist; 
(ii) moral obligations to the future exist, but the future is assigned less weight than 
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the present; and 
(iii) rights and interests of future persons are the same as those of contemporary 
persons. 
This is an incomplete ranking and should also include: 
(iv) moral obligations to the future exist, and the future is assigned more weight than 
the present.' 
There is an obvious correlation between the economic and philosophical perspectives. 
The economist's (iii) splits Lemons' third viewpoint into two, and forces a clarification 
of what "same" is used to imply. As members of the current generation we may weigh 
our own welfare differently over our own life-times; treating the future as less 
valuable. If future generations are to be treated in the "same" way, then the 
intertemporal and intergenerational discount rates should be equal. Yet, weighting 
the present more heavily than the future is often a myopic policy for ourselves. For 
example, intratemporally, people fail to provide adequately for their retirement, 
leading to government support for the elderly. More importantly, as mentioned 
earlier, any positive discount rate will cause catastrophes in the further future to be 
reduced to insignificant factors in the present decision maldng process. 
The acceptance of discounting as the proper approach to intertemporal distribution 
requires an unavoidable moral judgement.9 A zero social discount rate, where 
intergenerational decisions are involved, would prevent future environmental damages 
implicitly being ignored. Only at the extreme of an infinite discount rate would no 
future effects of current actions be taken into account. More commonly an arbitrary 
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but positive rate is used in cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the future is held to matter, 
but how far this is so depends on the rate chosen. 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCOUNTING 
Four general justifications for discounting the future effects of present actions can be 
identified.lo First, the very temporal location of our descendants disqualifies them 
from equal treatment with current members of the body politic. Yet does this mean 
future people should be treated as if they were already dead? The current generation 
does affect the probability that future individual's need for drinkable water and desire 
for clean air will be satisfied. Assuming the existence of a given population, when 
should the effective dividing line be drawn between now and the less important 
future?1I Factors such as age, temperament, or interest change the chosen dividing 
point of time into present and future. Failing to acknowledge the importance of 
environmental degradation in the future, just because psychologically it is thought of 
as separated from the present, is totally arbitrary.12 
Second, the argument has been made that we should restrict our attention to the 
aspects of our actions for which preferences are known and exclude unknown future 
preferences. This argument is similar in line of reasoning to the need for personal 
identity in making hypothetical intergenerational contracts.13 That is, no coherent 
sense can be given to making persons better or worse off if the specific persons are 
different ex ante and ex post. This argument relies on the assumption that all rights 
come from individuals and therefore the identity of individuals is central to their 
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rights. Thus, individuals cannot claim to have been hanned by the actions of their 
predecessors which leave them in poverty (for example) because their existence is 
contingent upon the events causing their poverty. As long as future individuals do not 
regret their existence, any action is then justified no matter what the consequences 
because the future identity of individuals is determined by the action. 
These lines of reasoning fail to account for the fact that there can be wrongs to future 
persons despite indeterminacy concerning their identities and our ignorance of their 
special needs. Whoever exists can be reasonably expected to have the same 
biological and social needs as those now existing. Along these lines Annette Baier 
has concluded that .... the wrongs we can do a future person are usually restricted to 
injuries to interest fIXed before the identity of future persons are fixed (and to such 
frustrations and pain as is consequent upon the injury to such interests), and cannot 
include injury to interests not yet fIXed or frustration of wants and concerns not yet 
fixed or hurts to sensibilities not yet fixed".14 A safe assumption is that the basic 
human needs for food, shelter, health, and security will remain a prerequisite for the 
satisfaction of other desires.l.S 
In addition, David Richards has argued that the relevant moral issue is to determine 
how, whoever exists, persons will fare under different policies.16 Thus, regardless of 
who exists they will be better off without, for example, cancer. The choice between 
societies made up of cancer ridden individuals and cancer free individuals does not 
require that the individuals be identified. The identity of the persons under 
alternative policies is irrelevant. 
8 
The third attempted justification is that the human race will at some stage become 
extinct, so more consumption today prevents potential resource wastage tomorrow. If 
this extinction is exogenous (eg, due to the cooling of the sun) and the date can be 
predicted the intergenerational distribution of world resources could be arranged to 
ensure nothing was leftY Uncertainty concerning the extinction date would be solved 
by maintaining a reserve, as an insurance policy. This is much the same problem as 
an individual faces in allocating consumption over their lifetime. The point is that 
exogenous extinction can, at least theoretically, be considered without discriminating 
against the future to the extent of effectively excluding it from current decisions. 
Endogenous extinction implies the human race is in control of the factors which 
determine extinction. For example, assuming the earth has a finite stock of energy, 
and evolution is irrevocable, a high consumption rate today means fewer lives in the 
future. Yet, such control over our own destiny does not imply weighing the 
importance of the future less than that of the present. The literature concerning such 
internal determination of extinction varies in solution from Georgescu-Roegen, 18 
arguing for intergenerational equity, to the spaceship earth literature,19 emphasising 
increases in future consumption to balance environmental degradation. 
The fourth and final justification for discounting relies upon the uncertainty of future 
events. For example, where the uncertainty concerns the demand for a depletable 
resource it is assumed to be positively related to the distance in time from the 
depletion decision. The conventional answer is to reflect such uncertainty in an 
increase in the discount rate; resulting in a faster rate of depletion. Fisher has shown 
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how the type of uncertainty under consideration can result in either increased or 
decreased depletion rates.- That is, uncertainty can result in resources being 
preserved for the future rather than depleted faster. Thus, where assimilative 
capacity is being depleted, with uncertainty as to the stock, risk aversion would argue 
in favour of reducing the rate of depletion, es. reducing the rate at which carbon 
dioxide is released and atmospheric capacity is mined. 
Similarly, in public project appraisal the argument is put forward that the appropriate 
adjustment for risk is made by raising the discount rate used to calculate the present 
value of the investment. However, except under special circumstances, there is no 
welI-defined way to adjust the discount rate such that it will make the appropriate 
adjustment for risk in the present value of uncertain future benefits and costs in each 
period. This is explained at length, in the context of energy related projects, by 
Lind.21 
The argument might also be applied to projects which create long term damages. In 
this context, there is a probability that no damages will occur and this probability 
might be increasing over time. This is equivalent to arguing that undertaking actions 
which can harm others is justified because there is a chance they will remain 
unharmed. My loosening the wheels on your car is acceptable because you might not 
crash as a result.22 
Given the essentially ethical nature of this issue an appeal to ethical rules for 
guidance seems potentially enlightening. 
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ETHICAL RULES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
In order to focus attention on the intertemporal (between generations) resource 
allocation and distribution of welfare, economists commonly assume consumption is 
split equally among the members of any given generation.23 The assumption avoids 
intratemporal (within a generation) distribution and aggregation issues, and as a 
result treats generations as if they were individuals. Karl-Goran Maler has discussed 
the conditions under which the well-being of members of a generation can be 
aggregated and treated as a single unit.24 A similar assumption is to assume each 
generation consists of homogeneous individuals who can be represented as a single 
agent, see Norgaard and Howarth.25 Thus, even though economists work with a 
brand of utilitarianism which is individualistic (ie, all interests and benefits are 
interests or benefits of individuals) such assumptions effectively treat generations as 
single agents having utilities. This approach is followed below. 
In order to clarify the relationship between generations, environmental economists 
have reviewed the implications of adopting several ethical rules.2Ii In most instances 
the ethical rules have been defined in terms of individual welfare in a given state, and 
simplified so as to be expressed in mathematical formulae. Four ethical rules, as they 
exist in the literature, will be examined with the aim of finding the implications for 
the treatment of long term environmental damages. These four rules are the classical 
utilitarian, the egalitarian, the libertarian (Paretian), and the elitist. 
The elitist rule requires that the welfare of the best off be improved and sees actions 
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decreasing their welfare as wrong. The egalitarian rule is the exact opposite requiring 
the same for the worst off. (This Mu-Min approach is often referred to as an 
intergenerational Rawlsian rule. Egalitarianism is then a direct result of making this 
operational.) Both rules focus entirely upon the relative level of well being. without 
any concern about the exact sizes of welfare gains or losses. 
The egalitarian rule requires that the welfare of different generations be equated with 
each other. This implies a subsistence argument, given an indefinitely large or 
infinite time horizon, finite life-supporting resources, and an atemporal viewpoint 
That is, in order to spread a finite amount of resources across infinite generations, 
and maintain equity, all generations would be committed to living at a subsistence 
level. The fact that moving to such a subsistence level is precluded, because the 
future would then have lower welfare, means distributional transfers should maintain 
the level of welfare inherited. Any reduction of that welfare level must be countered 
by a corresponding increase. 
Elitism only considers future generations in so far as the welfare of future generations 
features in the welfare functions of individuals (selfish altruism) or the future 
comprises the elite. Distributional transfers will only be made if this increases the 
welfare of the best off generation. Injuries caused to future generations will be 
uncompensated as long as the welfare of the elite is unaffected. More than this, 
changes which improve the welfare of the elite at the expense of others will be 
undertaken. 
12 
Neo-classical utilitarianism (maximising total utility) focuses upon gains and losses of 
personal welfare, without any concern about welfare levels; requiring any generation 
to sacrifice one unit of utility when another generation can, as a result, be provided 
with more than one unit of utility. Intergenerational redistributions are made 
according to the respective marginal utilities of consumption, where utility is 
dependent upon own consumption alone.v A utilitarian ethical system would require 
intergenerational welfare redistributions if future generations have a marginal utility 
greater than the current generation. (Determining the marginal utility of future 
generations poses a practical barrier to making this requirement operational. In 
addition to non-existance there are the problems raised by measuring cardinal utility 
and interpersonal comparisons.) Compensation for the effects of long term pollution 
will occur when the marginal utility of the current generations' loss, from the 
compensation payment, is less than the future generations' marginal utility gain. 
Under a Paretian ethical rule the status quo is maintained; no redistribution of 
welfare is allowed unless at least one person is made better off and none worse off. 
The outcome of the rule will depend upon the definition of the starting point. 
Assuming the next generation can be at least as well off as the welfare level inherited, 
the Paretian rule requires transfers to maintain at least that level. Causing the 
welfare of the next generation to fall below that received from the previous 
generation would make the next generation worse off. Injury must then be fully 
compensated. 
liMITATIONS OF THE ETHICAL RULES 
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The attempts to vary the ethical basis of economics are somewhat limited from a 
philosophical viewpoint. Effectively the process of incorporation transforms all the 
rules into variations on a utilitarian theme. The Paretian ethic is a case of restricted 
utilitarianism, where total utility is maximised unless this makes somebody worse off.-
Central facets of utilitarianism also exist in each of the other rules. 
Utilitarianism has two main features, the principle of consequentialism and the utility 
principle.Z9 Consequentialism regards the rightness or wrongness of an act as being 
determined by the results that flow from it. The utility principle holds some specific 
type of state (eg, pleasure, happiness, welfare) as the only thing that is intrinsically 
good. The egalitarian and elitist rules as above also have the consequentialist 
principle and the utility principle. The only change from neo-classical utilitarianism is 
the concern over the welfare levels of specific groups, as opposed to the welfare of all 
groups as if they were one. 
This concern for welfare levels is not to be derided but is misleadingly represented as 
the incorporation of alternative ethical concepts. In fact, the two types of rule can be 
combined in one criterion. The use of welfare levels is but a variation on a neo-
classical utilitarian theme.:lO 
The problem which economists are confronting seems to go beyond the utilitarian 
framework. That is, in an effort to incorporate new philosophical ideas a challenge is 
being mounted against utilitarianism, but is then retracted by being subsumed into the 
utilitarian framework. As is argued below, the confrontation is between a 
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deontological perspective and a teleological one. 
Teleological ethical theories place the ultimate criterion of morality in some non-
moral value (eg welfare) that results from acts. Such theories see only instrumental 
value in the acts but intrinsic value in the consequences of those acts. In contrast, 
deontological ethical theories attribute intrinsic value to features of the act 
themselves. For example, lying is wrong even when it produces better consequences 
than any of the alternatives.J! 
INVIOLABLE RIGHTS VERSUS COMPENSATION 
Under the ethical rules considered above the relative merits of social states depend 
uniquely on the personal welfare characteristics of the respective states; excluding 
considerations of rights. If two states generate the same personal welfare values for 
each person, under welfarism, they {Ilust be treated in exactly the same way. 
Intergenerational efficiency as defined under these ethical rules allows for the 
violation of human rights.32 The idea of a right to remain unharmed by others can 
easily conflict with these rules. 
As Sen has pointed out,33 even if the future generation may be richer and may enjoy 
a higher welfare level, and even if its marginal utility from the consumption gain is 
accepted to be less than the marginal welfare loss of the present generation, this may 
still not be accepted to be decisive for rejecting intergenerational transfers when the 
alternative implies uncompensated long term effects of pollution. As far as the 
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Pareto Criterion is concerned the present generation might be well off and future 
generations starving and cancer-ridden due to the greenhouse effect and stratospheric 
ozone depletion, yet the future could only be made better off by making the present 
worse off. 
The transfer of a set of "goods' may be unacceptable as an attempt to correct for loss 
or injury due to the violation of the rights of future generations. As 8arry has stated, 
doing harm is in general not cancelled out by doing good.34 Thus, a sea level rise due 
to the melting of the Antartic ice sheet is in general not cancelled out by 
compensation. Conversely compensation does not licence society to pollute, provided 
the damages created are less than the amount of compensation. In which case 
compensation cannot be used as an excuse to continue actions causing long term 
environmental damages. The question is, given that they will exist, do future 
generations not just have rights but do they have inviolable rights? 
The justification for rights of future generations is similar to that for rights of 
foreigners. For example, consider the export of toxic wastes, say from country A to 
country B. Country A wants to be rid of toxic wastes and therefore pays country 8 to 
accept them. The right of 8's citizens to have an environment free of toxic wastes is 
bought and sold. Yet, should A act in this fashion? If A does not wish to have toxic 
wastes neither should they be imposed upon other countries. The rights of A's 
citizens to a toxic waste free environment cannot be bought by violating the same 
rights of 8's citizens. The same argument extends to future citizens of 8 or future 
citizens of A. 
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Many economists would object to the above line of argument and to a ban on the 
international trade in toxic wastes because the contracting parties are entering into an 
agreement of their own free will. Yet, even if asymmetries of information between 
contracting parties and disparities in their relative wealth are absent, a ban can be 
justified by appealing to a different philosophy. Contrary to economic philosophy 
there are many cases of intrinsic human values, which societies protect from violation 
by contractual agreement. For example, the right not to be a slave, to freedom of 
speech, to freedom from torture, to sue another party. Freely contracting children 
are protected from working in coal mines despite the potential economic gains. The 
value of maintaining such inviolable rights is not reduced because there are those 
who would, and do, accept the loss of their rights given enough money. 
The acceptance of an inviolable right of future generations to be free of 
intergenerational environmental damages would have serious policy implications. 
Compensation could no longer be used to justify environmental degradation in 
violation of such rights, although there would still be a role for compensation. 
Irreversible damages, which cannot be prevented by stopping pollutant emissions or 
other actions responsible for future damages, would require compensation. 
Uncertainty over the consequences of our actions and a persistent drive away from 
environmentally benign production and consumption processes would ensure a 
continued need for compensation. 
However, all actions causing long term environmental damages would have to be 
stopped. The current generation would be obliged to identify all activities causing 
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long term damages and ban them regardless of the cost Immediately this raises the 
problem of conflicting rights across generations. The continuation of Ilctivities 
creating long term damages denies the future the right to remain undamaged and 
asserts the dominance of the current generations rights. The current generation 
imposes damages regardless of the gain now and the extent of the future damages. 
For example, cbloroOurocarbon deo&rant propellants have very close substitutes and 
could be banned at little cost. While this would prevent the depletion of the ozone 
layer such a ban has consistently been resisted. However, we can ask whether people 
have the right to an undegraded environment or component of welfare the 
environment provides? If the latter ozone depletion can be justified as long as cheap 
UV protection is provided. 
COMPENSATION AND JUSTICE AS OPPORTUNITY 
The discussion of intertemporal allocations has evolved over time from the idea of 
splitting a fixed, finite cake to one of productivity and opportunity maintenance. This 
moves the emphasis from a particular resource stock towards the welfare generated 
from a given economic and political system given available resources and technology. 
As Solow has stated: "'The current generation does not especially owe to its 
successors a share of this or that particular resource. If it owes anything, it owes 
generalised productive capacity or, even more generally, access to a certain standard 
of living or level of consumption".M 
The problem posed by non-renewable resources is that future generations will have 
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fewer options, other things remaining the same. That is, for a given technology and 
capital stock output will be lower and environmental degradation higher. Barry 
suggests reduced access to easily extractable and conveniently located resources be 
"compensated" via improved technology and increased capital investment.36 
Compensation in this sense is the provision of basic transfers for, what economists 
view as, the maintenance of utility, and can alternatively be seen as productive 
opportunities. 
The level of "compensation" being referred to in this literature is restricted to the 
maintenance of a basic opportunity set, and therefore is appropriately regarded as a 
basic transfer. However, there is no particular reason to limit compensation for 
damages to a specified rule being used to determine distributional transfers. The 
reference point for compensation is the level of damages caused to the individual. 
The reference point for distributional transfers is the welfare level, difference in 
welfare, or opportunity set of others, eg, the current generation compared to future 
generations. 
Productive opportunity fails to clarify the two strands of moral argument being made 
here. First, that future generations have the right to a certain welfare or opportunity 
to obtain that welfare. Second, that actions which harm future generations require 
that compensation be made or activities be stopped. Reducing the stocks of non-
renewable resources affects future generations in a different manner from the 
creation of long term environmental damages. The concern in the case of resource 
depletion is for the maintenance of basic transfers. The concern in the case of 
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environmental damages is for reparations for the violation of the right not to be 
harmed. 
Compensation (defined as making amends for loss or injury) implicitly involves an 
asymmetry of loss and gain. Long term environmental damages entail an asymmetric 
distribution of loss and gain over time. IntergenerationaI compensation is the 
counterbalancing of negative transfers by positive transfers. This requires the use of 
transfer mechanisms, but all transfer need not be compensatory. For example, under 
an egalitarian ethical system the welfare level received from the previous generation 
should be maintained for the next generation. The current generation starts with a 
set of natural resources, environmental assets, capital, knowledge, and capabilities 
which can only be regarded as a means of compensation in so far as they can be used 
to increase, not merely maintain, welfare. 
An example in the intratemporal context should help clarify the distinction being 
made here, and show the usefulness of the definitions. Assume there is an individual 
who receives government payments because he or she is unemployed and has no 
means of support. The government provides for him or her a minimal standard of 
living. Without the government payments the individuals welfare may be assumed to 
be much lower. 
Assume that this individual lives next to a weapons factory run by the government. 
Unfortunately, there is a toxic waste dump Qn the site which has been leaking 
radioactive materials into the local environment. Following discovery of the leak, 
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there is a proven cause-effect relationship between the radioactive releases and the 
local high incidence of cancer cases. This individual has developed cancer since living 
in the area. 
Can the government now say to this individual that he or she is so much better off 
already, due to the payments the government makes to provide a minimal standard of 
living, that they need not be compensated for the cancer? It should not take long to 
realise that the two payments cannot be morally linked. One is made on the grounds 
of equity, and the other on grounds of injury. 
Yet, a common argument is that the current generation need not be concerned over 
the loss or injury caused to future generations because they will benefit from 
advances in technology, investments in capital, and direct bequests. These are the 
transfers society has deemed should be made to provide some minimal standard of 
living. Thus, on the discovery of the long term environmental impact of emissions of 
the greenhouse gases this generation cannot turn to the future and state that they 
have no obligation for intergenerational compensation because basic transfers were 
supplied. 
POTENTIAL AND ACfUAL COMPENSATION 
Modern welfare economics is based upon the principle of "potential compensation". 
That is, if the gainers from an action could compensate the losers the action is an 
improvement regardless of whether compensation is actually paid. If compensation is 
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actually paid the principle is nothing more than the Pareto Criterion. 
Freeman has claimed that the Pareto Criterion is not widely accepted by economists 
as a guide to policy and plays no role in wmainstreamW environmental economics.37 
He goes on to state that the basis of cost-benefit analysis is the hypothetical 
compensation criterion, whicl1 W ... is justified on ethical grounds by observing that if 
the gains outweigh the losses, it would be possible for the gainers to compensate fully 
the losers with money payments and still themselves be better off with the poliCY-. 
Thus, the justification for the results of cost-benefit analysis (according to this view) is 
that they are potential Pareto improvements, but Pareto improvements themselves are 
rejectedl 
The only use of the potential compensation criterion is, therefore, to deny the need 
for compensation. The ethical implications of such a recommended definition of 
efficiency are hardly acceptable.- Hypothetical compensation is consistent with 
making the poor yet poorer. 
A persistent view, among adherents of the positivist program, has been that 
economists should avoid evaluation and prescription. Talbot Page points out that 
applied welfare economists have largely limited themselves to one normative idea, 
efficiency, which is often regarded as so universally appealing and analytically 
tractable that they scarcely think of it as normative at all.3'J Thus, the potential 
compensation crite~on is useful in separating efficiency and equity, but has meant 
that discussions of actual compensation have been avoided on the grounds that equity 
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issues are outside of the economists realm. Page has argued persuasively against this 
view and for the consideration of equity and other normative concepts besides 
efficiency in applied welfare economics, especially where intergenerational issues are 
involved. Compensation is one of those other normative concepts and a different 
moral concern than just equity. 
Yet, ethical systems could be devised which would justify no compensation. For 
example, under some of the ethical rules discussed earlier long term environmental 
damages and the associated need for compensation could be ignored. In order for no 
compensation to be made for actions causing long term environmental damages the 
current generation could be either: (i) elitist with welfare dependent upon current 
consumption alone, and the belief that future generations will be worse off; or (ii) 
utilitarian with the belief that the marginal utility of future generations will be lower 
for all levels of consumption.40 Under these circumstances there will be no basic 
transfers either. Ethical systems requiring distributional transfers imply compensatory 
transfers will be made, when they are necessary. 
Economics has failed to confront the ethical implications of discounting. As a result, 
intergenerational damages are accepted without much concern. Where long term 
damages are acknowledged and taken into account they are weighted to be less 
important than present benefits. If after weighting damages are still significant 
enough to warrant compensation, this concern can be dispelled by either the potential 
compensation criteria or the existence of basic transfers. Two fundamental steps 
forward would be to recognise the need for actual compensation and to start 
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considering the existence of the intrinsic rights of future generations. 
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I am indebted to Andrew Brennan, Ralph C d'Arge, Richard Howey, and 
anonymous reviewers for insightful comments, without implying responsibility 
for the resulting product. 
1 The paper is not primarily concerned with the existence, size or composition of 
future generations. Implicit throughout the paper is the assumption that some 
stable population has been achieved, and will exist into the further future. The 
existence of an increasing population, which exacerbates the problems under 
discussion, can imply a moral argument in favour of population control. 
However, long term environmental damages can exist whether or not 
population is controlled, and are a function of the nature of our society not 
merely its scale. A world population of one billion can still choose to generate 
electricity with nuclear power, creating radioactive waste, or use 
chloroflurocarbons as aerosol propellants, destroying the ozone layer. 
2 Positive time preference means that individuals prefer benefits now rather than 
later. 
3 John V Krutilla and Anthony C Fischer, "Further Analysis of Irreversibility: 
Discounting, Intergenerational Transfers, and Uncertainty", in The Economics 
of Natural Environments: Studies in the Valuation of Commodity and 
Amenity Resources, by John V Krutilla and Anthony C Fischer, Baltimore: 
Resources For The Future, Johns Hopkins Press, 1975, chapter 4, p.61. 
25 
4 Ibidem. 
5 F P Ramsey, "A Mathematical Theory of Saving", Economic Journal, 38, 
no.152 (1928). A C Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, London: Macmillan, 
1932. 
6 David Simpson and James Walker, "Extending Cost-Benefit Analysis for 
Energy Investment Choices", Ener&y Polic;y, 15,3 (June 1987): 221. 
7 John Lemons, "Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide: Environmental Ethics and 
Environmental Facts", Enyironmental Ethics,S, 1 (Spring 1983): 31. 
8 This fourth category is not an unrealistic scenario. Consider for example the 
extreme sacrifices made by Russians after the revolution in order that their 
descendants might be better off. 
9 Talbot Page, Conservation and Economjc Efficiency. Baltimore: Resources 
For The Future, Johns Hopkins Press, 1977. 
10 The first three can be found in Gregory Kavka, "The Futurity Problem", in 
Obli&ations to future Generations. eds Richard I Sikora and Brian Barry, 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); Mary B Williams, "Discounting 
Versus Maximum Sustainable Yield", in Obli&atjons to Future Generations, 
Sikora and Barry; Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Enyironmental Concern. (New 
26 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and R Kerry Turner, "Wetland 
Conservation: Economics and Ethics", in Economics. Growth and Sustainable 
Environment, eds David Collard, David Pearce, and David Ulph (New York: 
St Martin's Press, 1988). 
11 Discounting assumes no dividing line because benefits and costs are reduced 
toward an asymptotic limit. However, effectively the future becomes 
insignificant as future values tend to zero. 
12 Nigel Dower, "Ethics and Environmental Futures", International Journal of 
Environmental Studies, 21 (1983): 29-44. 
13 Derek Parfit, "Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem" in 
Energy and the Future, eds Douglas Maclean and Peter G Brown, (Totowa, N 
J: Rowan and Allanheld, 1983). Also see, Bryan G Norton, "Environmental 
Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations", Environmental Ethics, 4 (1982): 
319-337. 
14 Annette Baier, "For the Sake of Future Generations", in Earthbound: New 
Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics, edited by Tom Regan, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984, 233. 
IS The Sumerians, living more than five millennia ago, enjoyed poetry, music, 
elaborately decorated pottery, art, and cuneiform writing. 85 well as having the 
27 
same basic needs we have today. 
16 David A J Richard&, "Contractarian Theory, Intergenerational Justice, and 
Energy Policy", in Ene[iY and the Future, eds Douglas Maclean and Peter G 
Brown, (Totowa, N J: Rowan and Allanheld, 1983), 141. 
17 Such an argument has been made by Geoffrey Heal, "The Intertemporal 
Problem", in Natural Resource Economics: Polic;y Problems and 
Contemporary Analysis, ed D W Bromley, (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff, 1986). 
The comment, by Ronald Cummings and Spencer Pearse, fonowing that article 
is also directly relevant to the discussion here. 
18 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entrom Law and the Economjc Process, 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
19 See Ralph C d'Arge, "Essay on Economic Growth and Environmental Quality", 
The Swedish Journal of Economjcs. 73, 1 (March 1971); and Ralph C d'Arge 
and K C Kogiku, "Economic Growth and the Environment", Review of 
Economic Studies, 40 (1973): 61-78. 
20 Anthony C Fisher, Resource and Environmental Economjcs, (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1981): 45-69. 
28 
21 This same point has been made in an application to nuclear waste, see Richard 
and Val Routley, "Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future" in 
Responsibilities to Future Generations, editor Ernest Partridge, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1980. 
22 Robert C Lind, "A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate 
for Evaluating National Energy Options" in Discountine for Time and Risk in 
Energy Poli<;y, ed R C Lind (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1982). 
23 Page, Conservation and Economic Efficien<;y, 153. Robert Solow, 
"Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources", Review of Economic 
Studie§, 41 (1974): 29-45. 
24 Karl-Goran Maler, Environmental Economics: A Theoretical Inquily. 
Baltimore: Resource For The Future, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974, chapter 4, 
section 11. 
25 Richard B Norgaard and Richard B Howarth, "Sustainability and Discounting 
the Future", presented at the conference on Ecological Economics of 
Sustainability, Washington D C, May, 1990. 
26 William D Schulze, David S Brookshire, and Todd Sandler, '''The Social Rate 
of Discount for Nuclear Waste Storage: Economics or Ethics?" Natural 
Resources Journal, 21, 4 (October 1981): 811-832; William D Schulze and 
29 
David S Brookshire, "Intergenerational Ethics and the Depletion of Fossil 
Fuels", in Coal Models and Their Use in Government Plannin&e eds J Quirk, K 
Terasawa and D Wbipple, (New York: Praeger, 1982); David Pearce, "Ethics, 
Irreversibility, Future Generations and the Social Rate of Discount", 
International Journal of Environmental Studies, 21 (1983): 67-86; AlIen V 
Kneese, Shaul Ben-David, and WilIiam D Schulze, "The Ethical Foundations of 
Benefit-Cost Analysis", in Eneri)' and the Future, eds Douglas Maclean and 
Peter G Brown, (Totowa, N J: Rowan and AlIanheld, 1983); AlIen V Kneese, 
et ai, "Economic Issues in the Legacy Problem", in Egpity Issues in Radioactive 
Waste Mana&ement ed Roger E Kasperson, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983),203-226; AlIen V Kneese and WilIiam 
D Schulze, "Ethics and Environmental Economics", in Handbook of Natural 
Resource and Eneri)' Economics. YoU, eds Alien V Kneese and J L Sweeney, 
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1985), 191-220; Ralph C d'Arge, "Ethical and 
Economic Systems for Managing the Global Commons", in ChanlUn& the 
Global Environment: Perspectives on Human Involvement eds D B Dotkin, et 
ai, (Orlando: Academic Press, 1989). 
27 An egalitarian argument can be made to follow from the utilitarian approach. 
This requires an appreciation of the law of diminishing marginal utility 
(additional income yields less than previous additions, though the total 
continues to rise), and assuming that all individuals are fundamentally alike in 
their preferences and capabilities for enjoying goods. In the strict form, the 
utilitarian argument for egalitarianism depends crucially upon the identity of 
30 
the utility of income across generations. At the opposite extreme, an elitist 
argument can be made, if the marginal utility of income of the rich generation 
is higher than that of the poor generation. On these points and their 
discussion in an intratemporal context, see A 1 Culyer, The Economics of 
Social Policy. (New York: Dunellen Company, 1973),64-90. 
28 The Pareto criterion is commonly applied in the intergenerational context as in 
the intragenerational context. That is, an initial endowment is allocated to 
each generation and then redistributions are allowed if they are Pareto 
improvemen ts. 
29 Louis P Pojman, Ethical TheO!)': Classical and Contemporary Readings, 
(Bel mont, California: Wadsworth Inc, 1989). 
30 See Amarya K Sen, "Approaches to the Choice of Discount Rates for Social 
Benefit-Cost Analysis", in Discounting for Time and Risk in Ener&y Policy. ed 
R C Lind (Baltimore: Resources For The Future, 10hns Hopldns Press, 1982); 
and Talbot Page, "Intergenerational Justice as Opportunity", in Ener&y and the 
Future, eds Douglas Maclean and Peter G Brown, (Totowa, NI: Rowan and 
Allanheld, 1983). 
31 Pojman, Ethical Theory, 663-665. 
31 
32 Sen, "Approaches to the Choice of Discount Rates for Social Benefit-Cost 
Analysis". 
33 Ibid, section 7, p.345. 
34 Bany, "Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy", 21. 
35 Robert M Solow, "On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources", 
Scandjnavian Journal of Economjcs. 88, 1 (1986): 142. 
36 Brian Barry, "Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy", in Ene[1l.)' and the 
.fi!lJ.G. eds Douglas Maclean and Peter G Brown, (Totowa, N J: Rowan and 
Allanheld, 1983). 
37 A Myrick Freeman, "The Ethical Basis of the Economic View of the 
Environment", in PcOl'le, PcniUjns. and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in 
Enyironmental Ethics. edited by Donald Van De Veer and Christine Pierce, 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1986,218-227. 
38 Edward J Mishan, "Survey of Welfare Economics - 1939-1959", in Welfare 
Economics: Ten Introduct0O' Essays. 2nd edition. New York: Random 
House, 1969,46. 
32 
39 Talbot Page, "Intergenerational Equity and the Social Rate of Discount", in 
Environmental Resources and Applied Welfare Economics: Essays in Honour 
of John V Krutilla. edited by V Kerry Smith, Baltimore: Resources For The 
Future, Johns Hopkins Press, 1988,71-89. 
40 A third case in which the future is better off and egalitarianism rules is in fact 
implicit compensation because the level of loss is being balanced against the 
extent to which the future remains better off. 
STIRLING DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS. 
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
1992 SERIES 
92/1 The Cost of Overtime Hours in British Production Industries 
Robert A Hart and Robin J Ruffell, January 1992 
92/2 Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of 
Pollution: An Empirical Analysis 
Nick Hanley and Ian Moffatt (NARU, ANU), January 1992 
92/3 Measuring Demographic Impacts of Development Projects: Some Methodological 
Pitfalls 
Dipak Ghosh, January 1992 
92/4 The Rights and Wr.ongs of Intergenerational Externalities 
Clive L Spash, January 1992 
92/5 The Economics of Independence Re-Visited 
David N F Bell and Sheila C Dow, April 1992 
92/6 Distinguishing Between Keynesian and Classical Unemployment: Evidence from 
France, Germany and the U.S. 
Jim Malley and Thomas Moutos, April 1992 
92/7 Pricing to Market, Exchange Rates & Macroeconomic Policies 
Jim Malley and Thomas Moutos, April 1992 
92/8 Reading the Message from the UK Indexed Bond Market: Real Interest Rates, 
Expected Inflation and the Risk Premium 
Eric J Levin and Laurence S Copeland, April 1992 
92/9 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules in a Monetary Union 
Thomas Moutos, April 1992 
92/10 The Valuation of Forest Characteristics 
Nick Hanley and Robin RuffelI, April 1992 
92/11 Valuing the Environment: Recent UK Experience and an Application to Green 
Belt Land 
Nick Hanley and Jacqui Knight (PIEDA), May 1992 
92/12 Earnings Inequality Among Women in Great Britain 1975-1990 
David N F Bell and Alison Coleman, June 1992 
92/13 Protecting Sites of Special Scientific Interest: Intrinsic and Utilitarian Values 
Clive L Spash and Ian A Simpson, June 1992 
Copies available from Departmental Secretary, Department of Economics, University of 
Stirling, Stirling FK94LA. 
